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T
here are many reasons for 
scientists to undertake research 
with colleagues in other 
countries. They may beneﬁ  t from 
sharing knowledge and experience with 
colleagues from different backgrounds. 
They may obtain funding that is 
directed to transnational projects. 
They may gain access to more diverse 
facilities and participants in research. 
They may acquire kudos, academic 
advancement, or commercial beneﬁ  ts 
from an enhanced international 
reputation. And they may also be able 
to undertake activities in another 
country that would not be permitted 
in their own country, due to legal or 
ethical constraints. 
In most cases, it will be lawful 
in their own country to undertake 
such activities overseas. It is rare 
for countries to have laws directly 
preventing their nationals doing 
research overseas that would not be 
permitted at home, or even bringing 
back the products of such research, 
unless they pose a safety risk, such as 
importing genetically manipulated 
organisms created overseas. However, 
some people have asked whether it 
is ethical for scientists to do research 
overseas in order to beneﬁ  t from a 
favourable regulatory scheme and 
whether there should be laws to 
prevent such research. 
This paper argues that, in the great 
majority of cases, there are no ethical 
reasons to prevent scientists from 
doing research abroad or using the 
research results at home, even if the 
research does not comply with local 
laws. To illustrate my argument, the 
paper focuses particularly on human 
embryonic stem cell research and a 
project in which international and 
multi-disciplinary experts agreed on 
a consensus statement setting out 
principles for transnational stem cell 
research [1]. The group of experts, 
known as the Hinxton Group, consisted 
of 60 scientists, doctors, philosophers, 
lawyers, scientiﬁ  c journal editors, 
federal regulators, and others from 
14 countries, who attended a meeting 
sponsored by the Wellcome Trust at 
Hinxton near Cambridge, United 
Kingdom in February 2006 (the 
project is described in [2]). The group 
developed and unanimously endorsed 
a set of international principles 
(summarised in Box 1), even though 
the law and the ethical procedures 
in their respective countries often 
differed. 
My central argument is that when 
research done overseas falls above a 
certain level on a country’s “ethico-
legal barometer” (see Figure 1), 
it should be assumed that there 
is not such a high level of ethical 
objection within the country as to 
make its ethical standards signiﬁ  cantly 
different from those reﬂ  ected in the 
international consensus statement. 
However, when the proposed 
research falls in the red zone of the 
barometer (very widely condemned; 
laws with extraterritorial application), 
compliance with the consensus 
statement would not reassure 
people in the home country. Such 
“red zone” research done overseas 
may be regarded as unethical and 
should be prohibited. If scientists 
in the home country seem inclined 
to do “red zone” research in other 
countries, the home country can enact 
extraterritorial laws to prevent them 
doing so. 
Issues in Transnational Research: 
A Scenario
Assume that an Australian scientist 
wants to obtain and study stem cells 
from a human embryo created by 
somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), 
so that the cells are immunologically 
compatible with those of the person 
whose somatic cells are used to create 
the embryo. In Australia, it is unlawful 
to create an embryo by SCNT and 
derive stem cells from it, but in the UK, 
those practices are lawful. 
Is there any legal or ethical reason 
why the Australian scientist should not 
be permitted to conduct the research 
in the UK, or to use the stem cells 
or research data obtained in the UK 
when returning to Australia? Could 
the researcher, his or her employer, 
or an Australian or UK agency that 
funds the research, face legal liability 
for a possible breach of Australian 
law? Can ethical concerns in Australia 
about the proposed research be 
placated by knowing that the research 
has undergone scientiﬁ  c and ethical 
scrutiny in the UK? 
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Is it ethical for scientists to conduct 
or to beneﬁ  t from research in another 
country if that research would be 
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The Law
The law is perhaps clearer than 
the ethical aspects of such cases. In 
the scenario above, the Australian 
scientist (and others associated with 
the project) will be acting lawfully if 
the research undertaken in the UK is 
lawful in that country, even if it is not 
lawful in Australia. It is a fundamental 
exercise of the notion of sovereignty 
which underpins international law for 
states (such as Australia and the UK) 
to determine and enforce applicable 
law within their own physical territory. 
Foreign nationals visiting or working 
in another country are primarily 
subject to the laws of that host country. 
Governments consistently warn their 
nationals intending to travel abroad 
of the need to respect the laws of 
the countries they visit or suffer the 
consequences under that local law. 
There are some exceptions to this 
general principle. The Australian 
government could restrict the use 
within Australia of research data 
or material obtained in another 
country, in the same way as it limits 
the importation of biological material 
under its quarantine and customs 
legislation. This means that the 
Australian scientist could not beneﬁ  t 
from using the stem cells in further 
research in Australia but would not 
be committing any offence against 
Australian law by doing the research 
in the UK. Similarly, an employer 
or funding body would not be an 
accessory to criminal activity, as no 
crime has been committed. There 
would only be a crime if a law was 
passed in Australia preventing scientists 
from undertaking the research in 
another country.
International law does recognise 
that governments can exercise national 
jurisdiction “extraterritorially”—that 
is, beyond the physical territory of 
their country. In Australia, this must 
be speciﬁ  cally stated in the relevant 
legislation; silence means that it 
applies only within Australia. National 
jurisdiction can be extended on the 
basis of a person’s nationality rather 
than the physical territory of the 
country where they engaged in their 
activity. Most countries (including the 
UK and Australia) have legislation 
extending the application of their 
criminal law to acts of their military 
personnel engaged in operational 
deployment abroad. Other examples 
of laws imposing criminal liability 
for nationals’ acts overseas include 
violations of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention and “sex tourism” 
(paedophilia). 
Thus, countries can extend their 
territorial jurisdiction, either by 
penalising acts of their nationals 
committed abroad, or by preventing 
their nationals from using the products 
or results of work undertaken overseas 
when they come back. In practice, 
however, such laws are rare and they 
will only be made when other countries 
have very different domestic laws 
and the activity is one that they really 
condemn (such as the development of 
chemical weapons or paedophilia). 
Although the laws on embryonic 
stem cell research vary between 
countries, no country to date has tried 
to enact legislation to directly extend 
its territorial jurisdiction in this area. 
The Council of Europe’s Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
prohibits the creation of embryos for 
research purposes [3]. However, a 
convention operates as law only if it 
is ratiﬁ  ed by a particular country and 
is made a national law. It will have 
extraterritorial effect only if speciﬁ  ed 
in the legislation. No country has 
done that. At most, countries have 
extended their extraterritorial “reach” 
by preventing the importation of 
certain bodily material, or by attaching 
conditions to funding of research 
overseas. For example, all recipients 
of United States government funds 
for research are required to follow 
applicable US regulations on research 
involving human participants, even if 
the research is done in other countries. 
The US restrictions apply only to 
government-funded or government-
regulated research, not to research 
funded by private agencies. Also, 
problems may arise where there are 
multiple funders or the US regulations 
conﬂ  ict with local laws. In such cases, 
the effectiveness of funding restrictions 
is varied in extraterritorial regulation. 
If the research is supported solely by 
federal funding, the US regulations 
must be obeyed; if scientists receive non-
federal funding, they can do research 
that would otherwise be prohibited. 
Presumably the reason that 
countries have not directly enacted 
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040010.g002
Each country’s laws generally apply only within its boundaries; laws with 
extraterritorial effect are enacted only when an activity is widely condemned (e.g., 
paedophilia)
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extraterritorial laws on stem cell 
research is that there is not sufﬁ  cient 
condemnation in the researcher’s 
home community of the stem cell 
research that is permitted in other 
countries (see Figure 1). Indeed, the 
same is true in other areas of science 
and medical practice. Australia, 
for example, has not legislated to 
prevent its nationals going to the US 
to undergo commercial surrogacy or 
to use commercially obtained eggs 
for infertility treatment, despite these 
practices being prohibited in Australia. 
There is no legislation preventing 
the use of research results from trials 
in developing countries, even if they 
fall short of Australian requirements. 
A foreign research project involving 
victims of capital punishment would 
not be allowed in Australia (where 
capital punishment is not permitted), 
but Australia is unlikely to enact 
legislation preventing that research 
in other countries (where it may be 
lawful) or the use of results from such 
research in Australia. It is only where 
there is a public safety risk (as with the 
importation of genetically modiﬁ  ed 
organisms) that laws have been enacted 
to prevent importation of a product 
of research, and they do not extend to 
doing the research in another country. 
Indeed, it is only with widely 
condemned practices, such as 
paedophilia and the making of 
chemical weapons, that countries have 
legislated to prevent their nationals 
doing those things overseas. There is 
no extraterritorial legislation on human 
embryo research, paying volunteers in 
clinical trials, buying eggs for fertility 
treatment, or engaging a paid surrogate 
mother. Views might differ on the 
acceptability of all these practices 
and even if they are not permitted in 
Australia, the community has not called 
for legislation to prevent Australian 
nationals doing them abroad. It is only 
in extreme cases that legislation might 
be demanded to prevent such practices 
as, for example, research on victims of 
torture. However, even in such a case, 
a country will propose extraterritorial 
legislation only if its nationals appear 
likely to engage in such practices.
Ethical Principles 
Whatever the law may be, however, 
the issues are more problematic if 
one takes an ethical, rather than a 
legal, view. Even if it is lawful for an 
Australian scientist to do research in 
the UK that is not allowed in Australia, 
is it ethical for Australian scientists to 
do that in order to avoid the ethical 
constraints in their own country? To 
what extent can one adopt a relativist 
approach: autres pays, autres mores 
(“other countries, other customs”)?
In considering this question, it is 
useful to imagine a continuum of 
conduct—a national ethico-legal 
barometer (Figure 1). Conduct in the 
red zone is prohibited by both national 
and extraterritorial laws; in the orange, 
prohibited only by national laws; in the 
yellow, permitted subject to national 
laws and ethical oversight; and in the 
green, permitted subject to ethical 
oversight. The two relevant areas are 
the red and the orange; in the others, 
there is no legal prohibition.
The red zone. For red zone 
activities, a relativist approach seems 
unacceptable. The conduct in the other 
country would not only be unlawful 
in Australia but would be widely 
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040010.g001
Figure 1. The Ethico-Legal Barometer: Australia 
(illustration: Anthony Flores and Loane Skene)
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condemned on ethical grounds, even 
if it were lawful in the country in which 
it occurs. However, more interesting 
issues arise if one adds some activities 
from the bottom of the orange zone.
Imagine that an Australian scientist 
wants to undertake reproductive 
cloning in a country where that is not 
forbidden by law and wants to develop 
the technique back in Australia. Such 
research would be unlawful in Australia 
and almost universally regarded as 
ethically unacceptable, particularly 
because of the unknown risks to any 
child born from such a procedure. 
Similarly, research that imposes severe 
suffering on animals, especially for a 
cosmetic rather than scientiﬁ  c purpose, 
would be widely condemned as well as 
unlawful in Australia, as would research 
that involves killing animals from rare 
and endangered species. 
Even if these types of research 
were allowed in another country and 
arguments could be advanced to 
support them, Australians might reject 
a relativist approach and not allow the 
results to be used in Australia (though 
if there were a real beneﬁ  t from the 
research, the initial repugnance might 
be overcome, which involves different 
moral issues). If activities were widely 
regarded as morally or ethically wrong, 
then no requirement of scientiﬁ  c 
rigour or ethical oversight in the other 
country would make them acceptable 
in Australia. Thus, although activities 
such as reproductive cloning are not 
currently the subject of extraterritorial 
laws, the law could be changed. If 
Australian scientists seemed inclined 
to undertake those activities abroad, 
the country’s ethico-legal barometer 
might rise, with extraterritorial 
legal restrictions being imposed on 
Australian nationals working abroad.
The orange zone. For conduct that 
falls within the orange zone, one might 
adopt a relativist approach. Although 
unlawful in Australia, such activities are 
not so much condemned as to require 
extraterritorial effect and may in fact 
be condoned by many Australians, 
even if a majority disapproves of them. 
Creating a human embryo by SCNT, 
for example, is unlawful in Australia, 
but many people support the English 
position where this is allowed and 
supporters can give detailed ethical 
reasons for their views. 
Supporters of SCNT argue that 
SCNT embryos are not true embryos 
because they are not formed from 
male and female gametes; they are not 
intended for use in a pregnancy; and 
they are not viable without extended 
scientiﬁ  c support. Alternatively, even 
if SCNT embryos are not regarded 
as being essentially different from 
“sperm–egg embryos”, it is ethically 
justiﬁ  able to use both kinds of embryos 
in research for a limited period 
subject to strict regulatory controls 
and ethical oversight because it may 
yield important scientiﬁ  c knowledge 
and perhaps lead to cures for serious 
genetic conditions. Indeed, it is 
ethically inconsistent to allow “surplus” 
embryos from fertility programs to be 
used in research (which is lawful in 
Australia as well as in the UK), but not 
specially created and non-viable SCNT 
embryos. 
In the orange zone, where there 
are no laws preventing scientists 
undertaking research in other 
countries and ethical views are divided, 
objectors may be reassured by the 
requirements of scientiﬁ  c and ethical 
scrutiny of the research in the other 
country. This was the starting point 
for the Hinxton Group who were able 
to agree on a consensus statement, 
despite its members coming from many 
different countries, with different 
laws and ethical principles [1]. The 
principles in the statement are based 
on generally agreed-upon ethical 
concepts, many of which are not 
expressly set out in the statement but 
incorporated by reference to “ethically 
acceptable norms”. 
These principles include observance 
of the practices of scientiﬁ  c 
integrity; not exposing participants, 
including cell and tissue donors, to 
unreasonable risks; fully informing 
research participants before they 
consent; and openness to ethical 
review. The principles are worded in 
general terms, like the international 
statements [4,5] and ethical principles 
on which they are based, and, 
like the international statements, 
they are silent on the creation of 
embryos for research purposes. 
(Both the Declaration of Helsinki 
[4] and the Council for International 
Organizations of Medical Sciences’ 
International Ethical Guidelines for 
Biomedical Research Involving Human 
Subjects [5] do not discuss embryo 
Box 1. Some Ethical Principles Agreed Upon by the Hinxton Group 
The consensus statement published by the Hinxton Group said that stem cell 
research “holds out immense promise for good” but acknowledged “the reality of 
cultural diversity and moral disagreement” about some aspects of it. It said that “Law 
makers should be circumspect when regulating science”; laws should be ﬂ  exible to 
“accommodate rapid scientiﬁ  c advance”; and laws should not be extraterritorial. The 
statement set out the following ethical responsibilities of scientists, journal editors, and 
scientiﬁ  c academies and organisations (which I have paraphrased). 
•  Scientists should conduct research only if it is scientiﬁ  cally and ethically defensible 
and undertaken according to ethically accepted norms, especially protecting the well-
being, liberty, and rights of cell and tissue donors and research participants. Scientists 
should obtain valid informed consent from research participants and address conﬂ  icts 
of interest. If requested by editors, they should provide protocols for ethics review, 
consent forms, and information statements. They should submit any stem cell lines 
they derive to national or international depositaries and make cell lines and data 
publicly available. 
•  Journal editors should promote high standards for scientiﬁ  c peer review. They should 
require authors to state whether their research complies with local laws and policies, 
including ethical oversight. They should encourage authors to include in manuscripts 
explicit descriptions of their roles in the published research and to submit data 
verifying the source of cells, the authenticity of the cell line(s), and how the scientists 
have complied with good cell culture practice. 
•  Academies of science and professional organisations in consultation with the public 
should continue to develop guidelines for the ethical conduct of stem cell research 
and clinical trials, including the “challenges of international collaboration”. A public 
database should be established of “statements of ethical conduct and guidance, 
research protocols, consent forms, [and] information provided to potential human 
subjects and tissue donors…”
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research. The latter guidelines note 
that “An attempt to craft a guideline 
on the topic proved unfeasible. At 
issue was the moral status of embryos 
and fetuses and the degree to which 
risks to the life or well-being of these 
entities are ethically permissible”.) 
The Hinxton principles do not even 
suggest that human embryos have a 
special moral signiﬁ  cance. They do not 
require, for example, that the use of 
embryos in research and the number 
used should be justiﬁ  ed. The only 
relevant statement that could perhaps 
apply to embryos is that “any risk of 
harm should be commensurate with 
expected overall beneﬁ  t”, and that 
might refer to the need to protect 
women from exploitation as egg 
donors, or other research participants 
from potential harms. 
Conclusion
How reassuring are broad ethical 
principles in international consensus 
statements, such as the one produced 
by the Hinxton Group, for people who 
have deeply held ethical objections to 
the type of research that is conducted 
in other countries? As noted, the issue 
of greatest contention, the creation of 
embryos for research, is not addressed 
in the Hinxton statement. Also, 
objectors are asked to take on faith 
that research will be scientiﬁ  cally and 
ethically monitored under another 
country’s regime, but this monitoring 
cannot be checked or enforced in 
another country as it can in the home 
country. 
In Australia, for example, human 
embryo research is monitored by 
a federal licensing committee and 
government inspectors with broad 
powers to enforce the legislation. If 
the scientiﬁ  c integrity of a project 
is questioned, or there is any doubt 
about whether participants entered the 
project freely after proper information 
and consent, then those matters can be 
investigated by calling for the records 
of the project, including the plain 
language statement and the consent 
form. Similarly, it would be possible for 
the government authorities responsible 
for testing and approving new drugs 
and procedures to examine the records 
to check the accuracy of scientiﬁ  c data. 
That is not the case when research is 
done in another country. Even if there 
is provision in that country for external 
examination of records associated with 
a research trial, the procedure cannot 
be instigated or enforced by Australian 
authorities. Also, the review that may 
be needed for quality assurance of 
imported stem cell lines and other 
biological substances depends largely 
on the cooperation of the collaborators 
in other countries.
On the other hand, the principles 
and procedures approved by the 
Hinxton Group do suggest that 
countries can agree to adopt a 
similar approach to particular types 
of research, at least in relation to 
scientiﬁ  c and ethical oversight being 
the best form of regulation rather than 
national laws. The real issue is how 
helpful such principles will be when 
there are wider and more deeply held 
differences of opinion about particular 
types of research. With human embryo 
research, views may vary about what 
is permissible or people may agree 
to differ on the source of embryonic 
stem cells for research. Issues may 
then be resolved by general, fairly non-
contentious principles for scientiﬁ  c and 
ethical oversight, such as those in the 
Hinxton statement. For research that is 
even more contentious, where orange 
zone activities may be made red ones, 
one cannot imagine that a consensus 
approach would be possible.  
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